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Behavior analytic researchers have used single-case designs to evaluate variables at 
multiple levels of analysis. In this thesis, three analyses of voter turnout were conducted 
with single-case design. The first analysis used a multiple-baseline design to evaluate the 
effect of compulsory voting on voter turnout in parliamentary elections. The second 
analysis used scatterplots to evaluate the effect of the density of registered voters to 
polling stations on turnout within constituencies in parliamentary elections. The final 
analysis used a repeated A-B design to evaluate the effect of the duration of party control 
on popular vote for nations in which two parties receive the majority of votes. The 
discussion addresses the future use of these experimental tools with aggregated behaviors 
produced by groups. Further, the findings are linked to current understandings of 
behavior principles, which reveal several avenues for future behavior analytic research 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
Behavior analysts have many analytic tools to evaluate behavior and its 
controlling relations. These tools are arranged into three broad categories: indirect, 
descriptive, and experimental (see Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007). Indirect tools 
organize information reported by other observers to aid formulating a functional 
behavioral relation. Descriptive tools operate similarly to indirect tools, except 
information is gathered directly by the investigator. Experimental tools systematically 
manipulate one or more variables and measure any changes in one or more behaviors. 
Experimental tools offer the greatest confidence in detecting relations between variables, 
and direct and systematic replication further strengthens findings.  
Behavior analysts also select behavior analytic tools that appropriately match the 
level of their analysis (Meazzini & Ricci, 1986), which is primarily concerned with the 
individual organism. At the individual level, researchers specify whether their interest is 
molecular (i.e., a single instance of a behavior) or molar (i.e., the demonstration of a 
behavioral repertoire over time). The group level of analysis aggregates the responding of 
several subjects; the group is the subject (Dallery, Cassidy, & Raiff, 2013; Hayes & 
Fryling, 2009). Groups can be investigated in isolation (within-group analyses) or in 
comparison to other groups (between-group analyses). Organizational levels of analysis 
may use individuals or groups as subjects—the difference is that this level captures 
behaviors that interlock to bring about a product. Organizational analyses may be either 
process (i.e., the analysis of behavioral chains and their products) or system (i.e., the 




Analytic tools may be appropriate at one level of analysis but inappropriate at 
other levels of analysis. However, some tools and levels of analysis have been reasoned 
to be more or less appropriate for some behavioral phenomenon (e.g., Baer, 1977). This 
discussion is not concerned with drawing limitations for any given analytic tool. Rather, 
the following invites readers to considering using one particular tool for both individual 
and group levels of analysis: interrupted time series designs. 
Behavior analysts have extensively used interrupted time-series designs as an 
experimental tool to evaluate relations among phenomena (see Barlow, Nock, & Hersen, 
2009). Interrupted time-series designs use frequent and repeated measurement of the 
dependent variable(s) before, during, and sometimes after an investigator systematically 
introduces and withdraws an independent variable. These designs allow investigators to 
test for functional relations between phenomena. Interrupted time-series designs can be 
used at both individual and group levels of analysis. The dependent measure at the 
individual level of analysis is the individual’s response, whereas the dependent measure 
at the group level of analysis is aggregated responding. The term single-case or single-
subject design has emerged to describe interrupted time-series designs used with 
individuals (Cooper et al., 2007); however, the single-case can be used to describe 
interrupted time-series designs used with groups (Kazdin, 2011), in that the aggregated 
responding of the group is treated as one single phenomenon or single-case (Dallery, 
Cassidy, & Raiff, 2013; Hayes & Fryling, 2009). 
Single-case designs come in many varieties, though three standardized designs 
have emerged: the reversal, alternating treatments, and multiple baseline design 




intervention: baseline (i.e., no presence of the independent variable), intervention (i.e., 
the introduction of the independent variable), and reversal (i.e., return to baseline). For 
example, Reynolds, Dallery, Shroff, Patak, and Leraas (2008) demonstrated the lasting 
effects of a web-based intervention for prolonging cigarette smoking abstinence by 
frequently measuring the carbon-monoxide levels in participant’s breath before, during, 
and after intervention. Some choose to implement a fourth phase—the reintroduction of 
the independent variable—to better demonstrate a functional relation of the independent 
variable and the dependent measure. Larson, Normand, Morley, and Miller (2014) used a 
fourth phase in a reversal design to demonstrate the effects of teacher interactions during 
physical education on increasing the number of minutes that students engage in physical 
activities. 
Alternating treatment designs rapidly alternate two or more different experimental 
phases with different independent variables to compare their effects on a dependent 
measure. As an example, Fogel, Miltenberger, Graves, and Koehler (2010) rapidly 
alternated two independent variables for four students participating in physical education 
in a public school gymnasium: (i) regular physical education led by a teacher and (ii) 
exergaming (i.e., games played through electronic entertainment systems that require 
players to exercise as part of the game) activity stations, and measured corresponding 
effects on, (i) minutes of physical activity and (ii) opportunities to engage in physical 
activity. The dependent measures revealed that all participants engaged in more physical 
activity during the exergaming condition and that exergaming presented more 




There are instances where the independent variable cannot be withdrawn, and in 
those cases, it is recommended that investigators use a multiple baseline design (Barlow 
et al., 2009). Multiple baseline designs systematically stagger the introduction of an 
independent variable across people, behaviors, or settings (Kratochwill et al., 2010). For 
instance, Stokes, Luiselli, Reed, and Fleming (2010) systematically implemented 
differential feedback across multiple high school football players, holding each in 
baseline until time could be sufficiently ruled out as a variable influencing change in the 
dependent measure. One key element of the multiple baseline design is that the baselines 
must occur at the same time—failure to sync up the baselines will result in a loss of 
control that is typified in this design (see Harris & Jenson, 1985a, 1985b; cf. Hayes, 
1981, 1985).  
Each of these three single-case designs have been used to evaluate a wide variety 
of socially significant phenomena among individuals, including (but not limited to) 
developmental disabilities (e.g., Cuvo, 1997), childhood physical activity (e.g., Fogel et 
al., 2010; Larson et al., 2014), pathological gambling (e.g., Guercio, Johnson, & Dixon, 
2012; Johnson, & Dixon, 2009), substance abuse (e.g., Dallery, Raiff, & Grabinski, 2013; 
McDonell et al., 2012; Reynolds et al., 2008; Silverman et al., 2007), and enhanced 
strategies for sports coaching (e.g., Boyer, Miltenberger, Batsche, & Fogel, 2009; 
Osborne, Rudrud, & Zezoney, 1990; Smith, & Ward, 2006; Stokes et al., 2010), 
abduction prevention (e.g., Beck, & Miltenberger, 2009; Poche, Yoder, & Miltenberger, 
1988), and public school education (e.g., Greer, 2002; Vargas, 2009). Further, these three 
single-case designs have been used to analyze other socially significant phenomenon 




(e.g., Fournier, & Berry, 2012), hospital safety (e.g., Cunningham, & Austin, 2007; 
Stephens, & Ludwig, 2005), traffic safety (e.g., Clayton, Helms, Simpson, 2006; Jason, 
Neal, & Marinakis, 1985; Schulman, 2005; Van Houten, Hilton, Schulman, & Reagan, 
2011; Van Houten, Malenfant, & Rolider, 1985; Van Houten, Van Houten, & Malenfant, 
2007), recycling initiatives (e.g., Conner, Lerman, Fritz, & Hodde, 2010; Keller, 1991; 
Larson, Houlihan, & Goernert, 1995; Ludwig, Gray, & Rowell, 1998), organizational 
behavior management (e.g., Austin, Weatherly, & Gravina, 2005; Fineup, Luiselli, Joy, 
Smyth, & Stein, 2013; Rice, Austin, & Gravina, 2009), sexual transmitted disease 
prevention (e.g., Montesinos, Frisch, Greene, & Hamilton, 1990), demining fields in 
Africa (e.g., Poling, Weetjens, Cox, Beyene, & Sully, 2010; Poling, Weetjens, Cox, 
Beyene, Bach, & Sully, 2011), and detecting Tuberculosis (e.g., Poling, Weetjens, Cox, 
Beyene, Durgin, & Mahoney, 2011). Evidently, single-case designs are flexible to adapt 
to a wide range of phenomenon. 
The above literature indicates that single-case designs are available to use at both 
the individual and group level of analysis; however, some questions may remain about 
how single-case design compares to other analytic tools. Turner (1986) partially 
addressed this question by evaluating the effects of pornographic imagery on five verbal 
and two physiological measures among men using single-case design at the individual 
level of analysis and statistical analyses at the group level. The single-case design 
revealed that there was a relation among the measured variables at the individual level of 
analysis; however, the statistical analyses revealed a weak relation at the group level of 
analysis. Turner demonstrated that the phenomenon of interest must be measured at the 




conclusions may be drawn. Similarly, Witts, Rzsezutek, and Dahlberg (2016) compared 
the findings of single-case design at the individual level of analysis and statistical 
analyses at the group level of analysis in an investigation of gambling behavior. 
Participants were shown videos of short sequences of slot-machine reels, with each video 
displaying a different win/loss/near-miss sequence. After each video, participants were 
asked how likely it would be to see at least one winning spin in the next 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 
spins were they to see the next five spins. The single-case design revealed different 
response profiles to each video, which was inconsistent with aggregated and statistical 
analyses. Statistical analyses detected several significant differences, however, these 
analyses were excluded because the results of the statistical analysis did not match the 
responses of any single participant.  
Further, there are emerging examples from the experimental literature suggesting 
that single-case designs may be a more appropriate design for evaluating functional 
relations within groups (Berry, & Geller, 1991; Dallery, Raiff, & Grabinski, 2013). 
Dallery, Raiff, and Grabinski (2013) used a multiple-baseline design and standard group 
statistical analyses to evaluate the effect of vouchers contingency on low carbon-dioxide 
levels in smokers. The multiple-baseline design revealed an effect, however, the standard 
group statistical analyses revealed no effect. As another example, Berry and Geller 
(1991) responded to research suggesting that limited automated reminders have no 
significant effects on seat-belt use by employing alternating treatment designs; in 
actuality, they do have an effect compared to no reminder in a little more than half the 
individuals participating in their study. In each of these studies, statistical analyses may 




independent variable. Single-case designs appeared to better detect the nature of some 
effects. These examples corroborate the sensitivity of single-case designs to detect 
functional relations, and indicate that single-case design should be used more often to 
evaluate measures within groups. 
One particular phenomenon where single-case designs may be well-suited is in 
evaluations of large groups for the purposes of informing public policy. Behavior 
analysts have previously called for a collaborative partnership with those who inform 
public policy, given the scientific analyses that are available (Campbell, 1969; Fawcett, 
Bernstein, et al., 1988). Behavior analysts have made little progress in this matter 
(Mattaini, & Luke, 2014), though efforts are underway (Biglan, 2016; Houmanfar & 
Mattaini, 2016). Recently, United States President Barack Obama (2015) issued a decree 
that government agencies should recruit behavioral scientists to provide 
recommendations on government related processes, protocols, or issues that require 
improvement. Shortly thereafter, the Social and Behavior Sciences Team (2015)—a 
United States government agency operating on Mr. Obama’s decree—reported the results 
of numerous studies related to public policy. Behavior analysts could contribute to such 
endeavors, though more behavior analytic research demonstrating how single-case 
designs can inform public policy may be necessary to establish the drive for such 
organizations to include behavior analysts. Indeed, this kind of research is also in keeping 
with the field’s endeavor towards influencing the world for the better (Houmanfar & 
Mattaini, 2016; Malott et al., 1995). 
Electoral reform is one such area that could benefit from the use of single-case 




target socially significant behaviors (Bear, Wolf, & Risley, 1968; Wolf, 1978). The 
casting of votes to elect individuals into a parliamentary assembly (here after simply 
referred to as “voting”) can be reasoned to be a socially significant behavior in many 
ways. Foremost, consider a government’s role as a controlling agency (i.e., a subgroup of 
citizens that function to control the behavior of the entire group [Skinner, 1953]). As a 
controlling agency, a government controls citizen behavior by codifying behaviors and 
their corresponding aversive consequences in the form of a bill of law. Those holding 
positions within government agencies, in this case parliamentary assemblies, influence 
those controlling laws. Further, the government as a controlling agency has the ability to 
reallocate resources produced by the nation via nature and tax collection. For some, the 
reallocation of resources may be favorable; for others, the reallocations may increase the 
probability of encountering aversive stimulation. For example, reallocating resources 
from the medical sector to welfare is beneficial for those that are unemployed, though 
less favorable to those whose jobs are lost in the medical sector. Therefore, for citizens, 
the opportunity to vote is an opportunity to indirectly decide what behaviors that will be 
followed with aversive consequences if produced by a citizen of the nation and how 
resources will be allocated. Without the opportunity to vote, citizens may elect to 
exercise other means of counter-control with respect to the government agency, either 
through escape,1 revolt,2 or passive resistance.3 Providing citizens with the periodic 
                                                     
1 An individual’s behavior that removes them from presence of a stimulus change placed within their 
environment by a controlling agency. 
2 Any aversive stimulus change directed at a controlling agency in response to the controlling agency’s 
delivery of an aversive stimulus change directed at the group, e.g., conscription is enforced and then 
protests and riots ensue, or monies are reallocated from education to the army and this results in widespread 
picketing by teachers. 




opportunity to vote can be considered an abolishing operation (see Langthorne & McGill, 
2009) for counter-control in that it reduces the reinforcing value for such behavior.  
Consider the composition of a parliamentary assembly. As a whole, one could 
consider a parliamentary assembly as a reflection of the values of a nation. In behavior 
analytic terms, this means that electoral ballots function as a reinforcer assessment, in 
that the population is provided with an array of stimuli and each individual has the 
opportunity to produce the behaviors necessary to vote for the stimulus that they most 
value. The aggregated product (Glenn, 1988; Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward, 2010) of 
this large-scale reinforcer assessment determines which individuals sit in the assembly. 
The outcomes of these assessments influence what kinds of laws the parliamentary 
assembly will produce—this is important given that behavior analysis understands 
parliamentary assemblies as controlling agencies that outline behavioral contingencies for 
individuals within the group (Skinner, 1953). Those interested in a controlling agency 
that best reflects the values of the population would understand that a higher number of 
electoral ballots (i.e., reinforcement assessments) completed by citizens during an 
electoral period is more likely to produce a parliamentary assembly that best reflects the 
citizens’ aggregated preferences. Said another way, the more people within the nation 
that vote, the better parliament can reflect (i.e., act in accordance with) the values of the 
nation as a whole. If parliamentary assemblies are elected with a low number of ballots, 
then it stands to reason that they may make decisions that do not reflect the values of the 
nation as a whole. For citizens, a large number of votes may avoid the addition or 
removal of behavioral contingencies that the group as a whole generally does not favor. 




the addition or removal of behavioral contingencies will be less likely met with 
problematic counter-control methods employed by groups (unless the agency deviates 
from the values upon which they were elected). Thus, a high number of votes helps 
ensure that the values of a group are best represented by the composition of the 
parliamentary assembly and it has the added benefit of allowing the governing agency to 
maintain overall group control with minimal interruption.4  
One present problem with elections is procedural sabotage between parties vying 
for control of the governing agency. Suppression tactics are one type of procedural 
sabotage used by parties competing to control the parliamentary assembly.5 Journalists 
have noted that some voter suppression tactics include robot calls6 that inform citizens 
that the day of voting has been changed, robot calls that inform citizens that a candidate 
has already won an election, robot calls misdirecting voters to incorrect polling locations, 
threats of jail time to non-citizens who vote, challenging eligibility of certain sub-groups 
suspected to not support the political party (Bronskill, 2015), and social media posts that 
mislead voters to believe that they can vote via text messaging (Hawkins, 2016). It could 
be reasoned that political parties use these tactics because a high number of votes may 
result in a loss of control over the parliamentary assembly. A lower number of votes may 
allow them to maintain control of a parliamentary assembly. Exercising voter suppression 
tactics is therefore a means of countering the counter-control of the group. It is unclear if 
higher voter turnout would increase or decrease the incidences sabotage. An increase in 
                                                     
4 Although, control by one party may motivate another party to begin attracting voters or altering the voting 
processes in their favor. 
5 This is achieved by holding the majority of parliamentary seats. A party with the majority of seats has the 
ability to pass laws without opposition. 




votes for one party could serve as an establishing operation for sabotage for another 
party. Regardless, the presence of sabotage is, in and of itself, another reason why voting, 
and voting as a group, is important for the group as a whole. 
If the logical arguments presented in the past two paragraphs have not swayed the 
reader to conclude that voting is a socially significant behavior, then consider some 
empathic appeals to vote. Empathetic appeals cite the investments that many have made 
to ensure that citizens within a democratic nation can continue to influence parliamentary 
assemblies. These investments may have been time spent advocating for a democratic 
system, skills performed to establish and/or maintain a democratic system, or lives that 
were lost during wars between democratic and non-democratic nations. In addition, most 
democratic nations have a history of restricting the right to vote to individuals of specific 
profiles (World Library, n.d.). Many of the subgroups excluded from voting later sought 
for the right to vote and succeeded. In sum, voting is also socially significant because 
people at some point valued the ability to counter-control government agencies in a non-
confrontational manner. These people traded their time, efforts, and lives for the right to 
influence parliamentary assemblies. For these reasons and others previously listed, a 
behavioral analysis of voting has merit given that it is clearly a socially significant 
behavior. 
There are some examples of behavior analytic research with voting. For example, 
Lamal and Greenspoon (1992) described incumbent re-election in the United States 
Congress using the metacontingency. Further, Visser (1996) found that voters are most 
likely to vote for the same party as proximal others (i.e., those who they frequently 




increase voter turnout in a community setting was conducted by Fawcett, Seekins, and 
Silber (1988). They observed an increase in the number of registered voters living in 
poverty when voting registration was offered at the site of two food banks. While these 
analyses are promising, a large-scale group analysis of voting within and across notions is 
absent. A search query of “voting,” “elections,” and “turnout” in the Journal of Applied 
Behavior Analysis, Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, The Behavior 
Analyst, Behavior Analysis in Practice, The Psychological Record, and Behavior and 
Social Issues returned zero behavior analytic studies that had either (i) analyzed current 
voter turnout trends (i.e., the percentage of eligible citizens voting across parliamentary 
elections amongst democratic nations), or (ii) speculated, tested, and/or observed 
effective tactics to increase voter turnout of a large population within an agency (e.g., 
government, business, organization). 
There are many behavior analytic tools that can be used to evaluate voter turnout. 
The following investigation sought to use single-case designs to evaluate voter turnout. 
Variables were not systematically manipulated; rather, post hoc electoral data were 
gathered for the purposes of analysis. While single-case designs are typically 
experimental, the gathered data were arranged to describe the relations between variables 
and voter turnout much like an experiment. In essence, the following analyses capitalized 
on previous environmental changes for the purposes of evaluating changes in voter 
turnout. Given the descriptive nature of this analysis, one other time scale design will be 
used to detect functional relations: the scatterplot. Further, the following analysis sought 
to display a few cases where single-case design can be applied to analyze aggregated 




employed. The first investigation combined a multiple-baseline design and withdrawal 
design to evaluate the use and absence of compulsory voting (i.e., aversive stimulation to 
those who do not vote) on voter turnout across numerous nations where parliamentary 
elections periodically occur. The second investigation used scatterplots to investigate 
whether there is a relation between the number of polling stations in a constituency (i.e., a 
geological boundary whose population vote for a representative of parliament) and the 
voter turnout within constituencies. The third investigation used a repeating A-B design 
to evaluate the effect of the length of a political party’s time in office on the popular vote 
within nations that notoriously observe the majority of votes split between two political 
parties. 
Analysis 1: Compulsory Voting on Voter Turnout 
Method 
Subjects. Groups of voters within democratic nations served as the subjects for 
analysis. Voters were from nations selected from the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistances’ (IDEA’s) Voter Turnout Database (n.d.-b). 
Nations were eligible for inclusion in this analysis if they met the following three criteria: 
(i) the nation must have held at least one parliamentary election between 1945 and 1955, 
(ii) the nation must have continued to hold parliamentary elections at least once every ten 
years thereafter until July 2016 (the date of this analysis), and (iii) if the nation displayed 
a change in compulsory voting law, then there needed to be at least four elections before 
and after the change. These three criteria ensured that there would be sufficient data to 
assess, and that there is at least some degree of stability (i.e., four years of consistency 




Dependent measures. Voter turnout was defined as both (i) “estimated eligible 
voter turnout,” which was calculated by dividing the number of citizens that casted a 
ballot during a parliamentary election by the estimated number of eligible voters within 
the nation, and (ii) “registered voter turnout,” which was calculated by dividing the 
number of citizens that casted a ballot during a parliamentary election by the number of 
registered voters. Admittedly, the accuracy of the estimated eligible voter turnout is 
suspect; however, it could be a better indicator than registered voter turnout. Certainly, 
there are voters that do not register, and thus, a measure using registered voters produces 
an inflated measure of voter turnout. As Saldana (2014) noted, some nations who use 
compulsory voting see fewer registered voters. Therefore, this analysis included both 
estimated voter turnout and registered voter turnout.  
Design. Voter turnout was evaluated using (i) a multiple-baseline design and (ii) 
statistical t-tests. The multiple-baseline design was chosen for this analysis given that 
compulsory voting could not be directly controlled. This design capitalized on previously 
arranged political environments by arranging the data as if conditions were controlled. 
This arrangement enables a visual analysis of changes in variability, level, and trend by 
comparing changes between conditions within nations, and changes between nations with 
differing compulsory voting laws. In this analysis, nations were organized by the 
conditions arranged by their governments: those that have not had compulsory voting for 
the entire observational period (i.e., A), those that have had compulsory voting for the 
entire observational period (i.e., B), those that established compulsory voting (i.e., A-B), 
and those that abolished compulsory voting (i.e., B-A). Second, grouped nations were 




each nation’s voter turnout was condensed into a straight line to better aid a visual 
analysis. Data paths were increased in weight (i.e., bolded) if the data path met the 
criteria for “high” level; data points were filled with colour if the election met the criteria 
for “high” level. 
T-tests were conducted between elections with and without compulsory across all 
nations, then specifically between nations that have always or never used compulsory 
voting, and then within nations that have abolished compulsory voting. 
Procedures. 
Data collection and interpretation. Voter turnout data were gathered from 
IDEA’s Voter Turnout Database (n.d.-b). IDEA gathers estimates of the number of 
eligible voters from statistics reported by the United Nations (Pinter & Gratschew, 2004). 
Estimated voter turnout and registered voter turnout were gathered and graphed 
separately for each nation. Each graph was visually inspected for variability, level, and 
trend (Barlow et al., 2009). Table 1 displays the definitions used for variability, level, and 
trend. If the data within a nation appeared to change over time, then variability and level 
were analyzed for each component of the data (e.g., “initially low variable ascending 
trend followed by a high stable no-trend”). If a trend crossed the high to low boundary, 
then it was marked as doing so (e.g., “an initially high stable descending trend followed 
by a low stable descending trend”). Outliers were removed from graphs for the visual 
analysis.  
Summative data regarding the variability, level, and trend of voter turnout were 
compiled. If the visual inspection revealed a change in variability, level, or trend over 




trend”), then the most current trend (e.g., “a low stable descending trend”) was included 
in the summative data across nations. 
Integrity of the graphical displays. Correspondence checks were conducted 
between the raw data and files used to generate the graphs to rule out transfer errors. 
Correspondence checks were conducted on 33% of the included nations (rounded up). 
Nations were selected for correspondence checks by drawing nation names from a hat. 
After selection, the raw data was compared to the data in the file used to generate the 
graphs. If the data did not match, the data were corrected and the entire correspondence 
check was restarted. This procedure repeated until a sample with 100% correspondence 
was obtained. 
Next, correspondence checks were conducted between the data and the graphical 
displays to ensure that scores were accurately displayed according to the design above. 
Correspondence checks were conducted on all relevant data for 33% of the included 
nations (rounded up). Nations were selected for checks by drawing nation names from a 
hat. After selection, the data in the file were compared to the display and the design rules 
above. If the display was not accurate, then the graph was re-produced to conform to the 
design and the entire correspondence check was restarted. This procedure was repeated 
until correspondence was 100%. 
Interobserver agreement (IOA) training procedure. A second observer was 
trained to conduct the visual analysis for the purposes of evaluating IOA. These second 
observers were required to either be graduate students in applied behavior analysis 
programs or people holding BCBA or BCBA-D certification to participate as second 




Appendix A contains the materials used to train the second observer. These 
materials included, (i) written instructions of the visual inspection method have been 
prepared, and (ii) 40 fictitious sample graphs with corresponding evaluations of 
variability, level, and trend. Each fictitious sample graph displayed a unique variability, 
level, and trend combination.  
Once recruited, second observers were first trained to evaluate variability, level, 
and trend according to the visual inspection method. Training consisted of behavioral 
skills training (Miltenberger, 2012). First, the second observer was given the written 
instructions for conducting the visual inspection method. Each component of the 
instructions was reviewed vocally with the second observer. Next, four of the fictitious 
sample graphs were presented with a model demonstrating how to use the visual 
inspection method. The last phase of training consisted of role-play and feedback. During 
role-play, the second observer was presented with one randomly selected fictitious 
sample graph and then produced a written evaluation of variability, level, and trend. 
Feedback followed each written response. Correct responses were defined as producing a 
written evaluation of a sample graph, using variability, level, and trend, that matched the 
data displayed on the graph. Incorrect responses were defined as producing a written 
evaluation of a sample graph that does not match the data displayed on the graph. Vocal 
praise followed correct responses, and corrective feedback followed incorrect responses. 
Corrective feedback consisted of (i) brief explanations with reference to the written 
instructions and (ii) the second observer erasing their evaluation and rewriting their 
evaluation. If the second observer produced an incorrect response following corrective 




produced a correct response. Only the first written response was scored for each graph. 
Scoring was collected with pencil and paper. The mastery criterion for training was 
defined as 90% correct responses across 20 consecutively presented graphs. No criteria 
were specified for when to re-evaluate these procedures if an observer did not pass 
training. 
IOA procedure. Immediately following training, the second observer was 
presented with the graphs of 10 randomly selected nations. If the written visual inspection 
of the second observer matched at least nine of the written visual inspections of the first 
author, then the second observer continued to evaluate the remaining graphs. Otherwise, 
the second observer was retrained using the training procedures above. Immediately 
following retraining, the second observer was presented with the graphs of 10 randomly 
selected nations. If the written visual inspection of the second observer matched at least 
nine of the written visual inspections of the first author, then the second observer 
continued to evaluate the remaining graphs. Otherwise, the second observer was 
dismissed from the study and a new second observer was recruited for training. All 
graphs reviewed by second observers were without any labels that may have identified 
the nation. 
Each written analysis was reviewed immediately after they were produced to 
ensure that second observer indicated variability, level, and trend. If variability, level, 
and/or trend was missing from the second observer’s analysis, then graphs were re-
presented with a vocal prompt to complete the analysis. Vocal prompts did not address 
why the analysis was incomplete, but simply that it was. This procedure was repeated 




IOA for variability, level, and trend were individually assessed. IOA was 
calculated using the Cohen’s Kappa calculation (e.g., Watkins & Pacheco, 2000). 
Cohen’s Kappa calculation holds a significant advantage over the regularly used percent-
agreement calculation (i.e., agreements divided by total possible agreements) because it 
accounts for the probability of chance agreements (Watkins & Pacheco, 2000). Kappa is 
equal to ((PO – PC) / (1 – PC)) where PO is percent agreement (i.e., agreements divided 
by total possible agreements) and PC is the probability of chance (i.e., calculated by 
summing the probability of chance for each measure, which is determined by first 
determining the product of (i) instances where a given measure was scored by the first 
observer or both observers, and (ii) instances where the same measure was scored by the 
second observer or both observers, and dividing that product by the total possible 
agreements). Kappa measures should be interpreted as follows: less than 0.40 is poor 
reliability, 0.40-0.59 is fair reliability, 0.60-0.74 is good reliability, and above 0.75 is 
excellent reliability (Cicchetti, 1994; Watkins & Pacheco, 2000). If a nation presented 
with two conditions (e.g., with and without compulsory voting, or vice versa) then each 
conditioned was individually evaluated for IOA. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 displays the 42 different nations that met the inclusion criteria for 
analysis. Of the 42 nations analyzed, 29 nations had never employed compulsory voting, 
9 had compulsory voting in effect for the entire period of observation, and 4 had 
abolished compulsory voting laws. Table 2 also displays the sanctions (i.e., aversive 




differences in the severity and schedule of aversive stimulation amongst nations with 
compulsory voting laws. 
Appendix B contains the graphs of voter turnout that were originally prepared for 
the visual analyses. Four outlier elections were removed from these graphs and other 
relevant graphs for the visual analysis (i.e., Belgium, 1946 estimated eligible voter 
turnout; Jamaica, 1983 estimated eligible and registered voter turnout; Trinidad and 
Tobago, 1971 estimated eligible voter turnout). Table 3 displays the results of training 
observers for IOA. Two observers were excluded from the IOA analysis. Following the 
exclusion of the second observer, the IOA procedures were amended to exclude the 
fictitious graphs and instead use national graphs with slight manipulations (e.g., the 
elections were flipped along the abscissa) when training the third observer (see Appendix 
C for these materials). Training for the third observer was terminated due to recurring 
disagreements about (i) what qualifies as a variability and (ii) where to separate the 
overall data paths when indicate a changing trend. This subjectivity brought about the 
following changes to the data interpretation procedures: (i) to eliminate guesswork, 
definitions of variability, level, and trend were updated (displayed in Table 4); (ii) 
changing trends were removed from the analysis; instead, only the overall trend from the 
last 50 years were evaluated in each condition; and (iii) the graphs for the visual analysis 
and IOA training were updated to include (a) two “constraint” lines (which paralleled 
10% above and 10% below the trends line-of-best-fit), (b) a measure the overall trends 
slope, and (c) connected data paths between elections separated by missing data. 
Appendix D and E contain the updated materials for the visual analysis and IOA training 




under these revisions. Table 5 displays a comparison of the visual analyses between 
observers. Tables 6, 7, and 8 display the agreements and disagreements of variability, 
level, and trend respectively. Kappa coefficients were as follows: variability = 1.000 
(perfect reliability), level = 0.965 (excellent reliability), and trend = 0.980 (excellent 
reliability). Overall, the reliability scores indicate that the observations were adequate 
enough to merit reporting the following results. 
Figures 1 and 2 display the condensed line graph of the level of voter turnout 
across elections within each included nation. Figures 3 through 11 display the level of 
estimated eligible and registered voter turnout across all included nations. 
Correspondence checks of the data revealed no transfer errors; however, four graphical 
errors were detected and corrected. Table 9 displays a summary of the visual analysis of 
level and trend across estimated eligible and registered voter turnout. In sum, nations that 
have high levels of voter turnout were likely to have maintained or improving turnout, 
whereas nations that have low levels of voter turnout are likely to have unchanging or 
descending trends. These results were consistent regardless of whether or not the nation 
employed compulsory voting laws. Compulsory voting appears to have a greater effect 
on the level of registered voter turnout. Table 10 displays a summary of the six statistical 
analyses. Two significant differences were found within the registered voter turnout data 
between all compulsory and non-compulsory elections, and specifically within nations 
that have always or never used compulsory voting. 
The results of this visual analysis must be interpreted with careful consideration 
of several methodological limitations. Foremost, even though the data were arranged in 




clear if fines in nations with compulsory voting laws have been consistently issued; there 
is some evidence of inconsistent applications of compulsory voting in some of the 
included nations (Bódeva, 2013; Irwin, 1974; Shah, 2013). Further, procedural 
differences between nations may contribute to the observed levels and trends of voter 
turnout. For example, how governments advertise the location of polling stations, how 
electoral commissions present instructions within polling stations, and procedural 
differences in how nations factor votes into representation in their legislative branches of 
government may account for some of the differences between nations. Effect verification 
is another concern. Although Figures 1 and 2 display data akin to a multiple-baseline 
design, in actuality, only the four nations that have abolished compulsory voting fit the 
standard arrangement for a multiple-baseline design. All remaining nations are simply an 
extended series of condition A or B. Thus, the effect of compulsory voting or lack thereof 
is difficult to verify for the vast majority of nations. What is left is a comparison of 
turnout between groups of nations. Finally, strict definitions were required to bring about 
reliable visual interpretations of the single-case design. The lack of these strict definitions 
and IOA procedures could have left this analysis open to concerns regarding 
interpretation. Thus, the functional relations drawn from this analysis must be recognized 
as a probable truth and are subject to further analysis. 
Limitations aside, confidence is garnered from several other methodological 
strengths. The comprehensive and systematic features of this analysis allowed for a more 
accurate comparison of voter turnout with and without compulsory voting than analyses 
that sample single elections. Further, repeated measures across national elections and 




by chance. The reliability of these observations were verified with the use of strict 
operational definitions and inter-observer agreement procedures. In all, this analysis has 
brought about an alarming summary: if a nation observes low voter turnout, then turnout 
is likely to be unchanging—or worse—deteriorating. Remedies and further consideration 
of compulsory voting are taken up in the general discussion. 
Analysis 2: Density of Registered Voters to Polling Stations on Voter Turnout 
Method 
Subjects. Groups of voters within democratic nations served as the subjects for 
analysis. Voters from nations in analysis 1 were eligible for inclusion in this analysis only 
if the nation published federal election measures (i.e., the number of polling stations, 
registered voters, and registered voter turnout within each electoral constituency) from 
the last three elections on the Internet. 
Dependent measures. Voter turnout was defined as the number of votes within a 
federal/general electoral constituency divided by the number of registered voters for that 
constituency. Polling stations were defined as the number of reported locations where 
voters could cast ballots. 
Design. Voter turnout was evaluated using (i) scatterplots and (ii) a statistical test 
known as regression analysis. Scatterplots were produced for each of the last three 
elections for each included nation. First, the ratio of registered voters to polling stations 
were determined for each constituency. Then, these ratios were paired with the voter 
turnout observed within the constituency. These data were then plotted on a scatterplot 
with the ratio of registered voters to polling stations on the abscissa and voter turnout on 




Next, the scatterplots were condensed into a strip-line plot to allow for visual 
analyses between nations and elections. National elections were placed on the abscissa 
and ratio of population to polling stations for each constituency were placed on the 
ordinate. Data for each election were jittered to aid visual inspection. Finally, each data 
point was filled according to a heat-map scheme that corresponded to that constituency’s 
voter turnout. Therefore, the “hotter” the fill of the data point, the higher the voter turnout 
within that specific constituency. 
Procedure. 
Data collection and interpretation. Dependent measures were gathered from each 
nation’s electoral statistics agency or electoral commission. Data for each of the last three 
federal/general elections were graphed separately. Outliers (defined as any data point that 
deviates more than two standard deviations from the mean of any related measure) were 
removed from graphs for the visual analysis. Then, each graph was visually inspected for 
a relation among variables using the direction of the line of best fit. A positive slope or 
negative slope indicated a relation; otherwise, a flat line indicated no relationship. 
Integrity of the graphical displays. Correspondence checks were conducted 
between the online data sources and data files to rule out transfer errors. Correspondence 
checks of all measures were conducted for 10% of the included constituencies (rounded 
to the nearest whole number). The Excel® function “=RANDOMBETWEEN()” was 
used to generate a list of random constituencies for correspondence checks. Then, the 
data from the randomly selected constituencies were compared to the data sources. If any 




restarted. This procedure repeated until a sample with 100% correspondence was 
obtained. 
Correspondence checks between the data file and the graphical displays not 
necessary given that the graphing process was automated by R Studio®. 
IOA procedure. IOA for this analysis was crowd sourced from the Teaching 
Behavior Analysis email listserv. Any reader of the listserv could submit their 
observations of the data through a Google® Form so long as they held BCBA or BCBA-
D certification (as verified by their BACB number provided during form submission) and 
indicated that they had experience using scatterplots to evaluate functional relations 
between variables. The scatterplots revealed relations or lack there-of so clearly that this 
analysis depended solely on the judgments of these second observers without training. 
Participating observers evaluated each scatterplot on their own computer. The 
same scatterplots generated for each national election were displayed within the Google® 
Form one at a time, except without labels indicating variables or the phenomenon of 
interest. One question was listed below each graph: “What is the relationship between the 
variables?” Seven answers will be displayed beneath each question: (a) “the graph 
indicates that there is a strong positive relation among the variables”, (b) “the graph 
indicates that there is a moderate positive relation among the variables”, (c) “the graph 
indicates that there is a weak positive relation among the variables”, (d) “the graph 
indicates that there is a strong negative relation among the variables”, (e) “the graph 
indicates that there is a moderate negative relation among the variables”, (f) “the graph 
indicates that there is a weak negative relation among the variables”, (h) “the graph 




answer per question. IOA was calculated using an exact IOA calculation, which divided 
the number of graphs with complete agreement among all observers by the total number 
of graphs. 
Results and Discussion 
Six nations met the inclusionary criterion for this analysis. One nation was further 
excluded following correspondence checks due to data inconsistencies from month-to-
month observations of the nation’s government statistical website. Table 11 displays five 
nations that remained in this analysis. Data were obtained online from each nation’s 
respective statistical agency or electoral commission (Australian Electoral Commission, 
n.d.-b; Elections Canada, n.d.; Electoral Commission, n.d.; Electoral Commission of 
Jamaica, n.d.; The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, n.d.). Appendix F 
contains the scatterplot graphs that were prepared for the visual analyses. Table 11 also 
displays the outliers removed from each nation, the visual analyses, and the results of the 
crowd-sourced IOA. No responses were received from the crowd-sourced IOA for this 
analysis. Without IOA, it is unclear if the following observations hold true across 
observers. 
Figure 12 displays the strip-line plot of the ratio of registered voters to polling 
stations within each constituency in the three most-recent elections within included 
nations. Figures 13 through 27 display each election observed within each included 
nation. Correspondence checks revealed the data inconsistencies in the excluded nation 
noted above, and as well as two errors in the Canadian data and inconsistencies within 




conducted five times before a sample met criterion. The visual analysis revealed no 
relation in any observed election. 
One limitation revealed by correspondence checks were data inconsistencies of 
publicly available data in one originally included, later excluded, nation. This irregularity 
suggests that readers should interpret these data with skepticism. All analyses did not 
control for data smudging—that is, differences between actual and reported voter turnout. 
In all cases, it was seemingly impossible to account for data smudging. Smudging could 
even occur before data were made publicly available, which brings the validity of all data 
into question. This appears to be a problem worth addressing in future behavior analytic 
research that uses publicly available data. Similar to analysis 1, this analysis could not 
control for all variables that may have contributed to the observed voter turnout. It would 
not be a surprise if future analyses reveal variables that compromise the following 
conclusions. For example, it is not known if voter suppression tactics—such as 
misinformation presented by automated robot calls (Bronskill, 2015)—were in effect 
during any given election. Future research might aim to identify tactics to better control 
extraneous variables, although this may be an ever-present shortcoming of naturalistic, 
group-level analyses. 
Barring future evidence of the above, the results of this analysis indicates that the 
density of registered voters to polling stations had no effect on turnout within nations. 
The nature of the scatterplot design enabled the detection of a relation by analyzing 
constituencies as clusters and evaluating patterns in how density and turnout vary 
together. If there was a relation, then the condensed scatterplot would reveal a “cooling” 




garners strength in consideration of the experimental rigor of single-case design. 
Repeated measures of polling stations across elections both within and across nations 
demonstrate that there is no effect. Further, the results of the regression analysis matched 
this visual analysis.  
The aim of this analysis was to assess the effect of response effort on voting due 
to crowding in or at polling stations, or distance to polling stations. The results indicate 
that response effort due to crowding has no effect on turnout. However, it could be the 
case that these included nations address crowding by carefully planning the number of 
polling stations with consideration of the number of voters within each constituency. If 
this is the case, then this analysis is compromised because government controls prevent 
an analysis of turnout when polling stations are added and removed. Future directions for 
polling station analyses are outlined in the general discussion.  
Analysis 3: Duration of Party Control on Popular Vote 
Method 
Subjects. Groups of voters within democratic nations served as the subjects for 
analysis. Voters from nations in analysis 1 were eligible for inclusion in this analysis only 
if each national election from 1945 to present observed two political parties consistently 
receive at least 70% of the popular vote combined. If the nation did not host presidential 
elections, then parliamentary elections were evaluated to determine inclusion. If the 
nation hosted run-off polls (i.e., any system that re-distributes or re-polls citizens to force 
a two-party race), the first ballots casted in each election were evaluated for inclusion. 
Dependent measures. Popular vote was defined as the number of votes for a 




off polls, only the first ballots casted in each election were evaluated. Other parties were 
noted only if their popular vote in an election exceeded 10%. 
Design. Popular vote was evaluated using (i) a single-case apparatus known as the 
repeating A-B design and (ii) statistical t-tests. With the repeating A-B design, conditions 
were defined by which of the two parties held power of the nation’s government. Then 
the percentage of popular vote for each of the two parties was graphed for each election 
observed. One party was coded with circles as data points, the other with diamonds as 
data points. The party in power was indicated with filled data points. 
Procedure. 
Data collection and interpretation. Popular vote data for each election was 
gathered from published encyclopediae and from each nation’s electoral statistics agency 
or electoral commission. Data for each nation were graphed separately. Table 12 displays 
the definitions of different trends and variables used to define the data. Elections with a 
third party conflict and conditions with only one election were removed from the graphs 
for the visual analysis. Then, each graph was visually inspected for the trend of popular 
vote among four circumstances, (i) trend of Party X’s popular vote given Party X in 
power, (ii) trend of Party X’s popular vote given Party Y in power, (iii) trend of Party Y’s 
popular vote given Party Y in power, and (iv) trend of Party Y’s popular vote given Party 
X in power. Finally, summative data of the trends were compiled. 
Integrity of the graphical displays. Correspondence checks were conducted 
between the data sources and data files to rule out transfer errors. 33% of the included 




IOA procedure. Similar to analysis 2, IOA for this analysis was crowd sourced 
from the Teaching Behavior Analysis email listserv. Any reader of the listserv could 
submit their observations of the data through a Google® Form so long as they held 
BCBA or BCBA-D certification (as verified by their BACB number provided during 
form submission) and indicated that they have experience using repeated A-B designs to 
evaluate functional relations between variables. These observers were not trained by the 
primary author because we believe that the graphs will reveal relations or lack there-of so 
clearly that we will rely solely on the judgments of these second observers for IOA. 
Participating observers evaluated each national graph on their own computer. The 
same national graphs generated for each national election were displayed within the 
Google® Form one at a time, except without labels indicating variables or the 
phenomenon of interest. Four questions were listed below each graph: (i) “What is the 
trend of the circles when they are filled?” (ii) “What is the trend of the circles when they 
are not filled?” (iii) “What is the trend of the diamonds when they are filled?” and (iv) 
“What is the trend of diamonds when they are not filled?” Three answers will be 
displayed beside each question: (a) “ascending,” (b) “descending,” or (c) “no-trend.” 
Observers could only select one answer per question. IOA was calculated using an exact 
IOA calculation, which will divide the number questions about a specific graph with 
complete agreement among all observers by the total number of questions asked. 
Results and Discussion 
Barbados, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, and the United States of America were 
included in this analysis. Data were obtained from tables in published encyclopediae and 




Electoral and Boundaries Commission, n.d.; Electoral Commission of Jamaica, n.d.; 
Hillebrands, & Falk, 2005; Landtagswahlen, n.d.; Linder, & Schultze, 2005; Marxer, 
2010; National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.; Wüst, 2005). Appendix G 
contains the popular vote graphs that were prepared for the visual analyses. Table 13 
displays the visual analyses and the results of the crowd-sourced IOA. Three responses 
were received from the crowd-sourced IOA for this analysis. The obtained IOA was 
81.25%. Three total disagreements occurred. One disagreement appears to be an error (as 
the displayed trends are clearly descending) while the other two disagreements occurred 
with trends that could be argued to be either a no-trend or descending. The subjectivity of 
visual analysis is a recurring theme that will be addressed in the general discussion.  
Figure 28 displays the popular vote of the included nations. Figures 29-32 display 
popular vote within each included nation. Correspondence checks of the data revealed no 
transfer errors. The visual analysis reveals that parties in power always observe a 
descending trend in popular vote, and that parties not holding power usually observe an 
ascending trend in popular vote (in 75% of cases). 
The limitations of this analysis mirror those found in the former two analyses, 
namely lack of control over the variables, the possibility of extraneous variables, and 
questionable data accuracy. However, of all three analyses, this repeated A-B design 
most clearly demonstrates the presence of a functional relation. The rapid reversal of 
conditions demonstrates a clear and reliable influence of a parties’ duration of 
government control on popular vote. Further, this effect is observed across all included 
nations. The reliability of this effect is evident. This consideration and related implication 





These three analyses demonstrate the potential of using single-case design to 
evaluate group behavior. One apparent shortcoming of single-case design concerns IOA. 
In analysis 1, strict definitions for variability and trend were necessary to bring about 
agreement with other interpreters. In analysis 3, definitions of trend were not provided to 
observers for IOA, which may account for why observers sometimes disagreed. The 
definitions used in analysis 1 were generated after informal visual analyses, which means 
that they are somewhat arbitrary and subject to bias. Future research could improve the 
definitions used in analysis 1 by investigating what best constitutes variability, level, and 
trend using mathematical reasoning. For example, segmented regressions could be used 
to identify changes in trend. Further, it may be the case that variability and level are 
relative to the phenomenon under study. A method that generates definitions of 
variability, level, and trend that appropriately fit different phenomenon may be of use for 
future research. 
Despite this shortcoming, single-case design captured the idiosyncratic nature of 
group phenomenon—different nations enjoyed similar turnouts under different 
circumstances. For example, nations with and without compulsory laws might see high 
voter turnout. This suggests that the influences for one group are different for another, or 
that influences unaccounted for in this study were similar between nations (e.g., 
motivating operations related to “national pride”). 
A comparison of nations showed that compulsory voting laws do not increase the 
estimated eligible voter turnout; however, compulsory voting does appear to increase 




established elections as a reflexive conditioned motivating operation (CMO-R; 
Langthorne & McGill, 2009). If this is the case, then voting is evoked because it 
functions as a negative reinforcer (in that, the citizen avoids the opportunity to receive a 
fine). Those eligible to vote may not register as a means to avoid punishment for 
remaining away from the polls. That aside, there could be an effect that was not detected 
due to the differing potencies of punishment used between the included nations. For 
example, Belgian voters who remain away from the polls could temporarily lose of the 
right to vote; yet, the same level of voter turnout is observed under Australia’s AUD$20 
fine. In comparison, Paraguay’s small fine appears to have no effect, and Mexico’s 
compulsory voting law is an example that threat alone may not have an effect. Future 
analyses might seek to study this phenomenon and determine if there is a correlation 
between the potency/aversive-quality of the punishment for remaining away from the 
polling station. 
That being said, our efforts in improving voter turnout might best be used in the 
pursuit of non-punishment-based interventions. Punishment is correlated with a variety of 
well documented side effects (see Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007, for a review). 
Nations that implement compulsory voting could observe common side effects on a large 
scale, which could take the form of protests, citizen violence, passive resistance to the 
laws (such as eligible voters choosing to remain unregistered), or emigration. Given a 
possibility of observing these side-effects with compulsory voting, it stands to reason that 
compulsory voting would undermine the primary function of elections (i.e., peaceful 
citizen counter-control of government control). Nations that are considering the 




Compulsory voting appears counter-intuitive and would only produce an environment 
where citizens have to vote; indeed, a better goal for researchers is to reveal tactics that 
influence citizens so that they want to vote (Lang & Witts, 2016). 
One variable that might affect a citizen’s drive to vote is response effort. Analysis 
2 sought to evaluate response effort by measuring the density of registered voters to 
polling stations against voter turnout within constituencies. One hypothesis was that 
higher density could produce longer lines, which might influence voters to remain away 
from the polls. The current findings suggest that there is no relation. One explanation for 
this outcome might be due to a mismatch between the research question and the level of 
the analysis. Here, it may be the case that this between-group analysis—that is, the 
analysis of turnout across constituencies and nations—does not adequately capture the 
effects of polling station density on voters. Future research may better address this 
question by conducting a within-group analysis of registered voter to polling station 
density. Another option is to turn to the individual level of analysis. Future research 
might attempt to capture voting when the polling stations vary in distance from election 
to election. Both levels should be evaluated before research forms a conclusion. 
Likewise, researchers interested in increasing voter turnout may find within-
group/procedural and/or system analyses helpful in identifying tactics that bring about 
higher levels of voter turnout. For example, a visual analysis of Figures 1 and 2 invites an 
investigation of variables that maintain high voter turnout in nations without compulsory 
voting, such as Iceland and Denmark. Within-group analyses could isolate the variables 
at play. Granted, control is again an issue; governments may be reluctant to experiment 




another. Alternatively, researchers should plan to conduct small-scale, local government 
research. Small-scale research is a standard first-step in analyses of organizational 
behavior (Austin, 2000), and has been recommended for a first step in changing 
organizations who impact climate change (Biglan, 2016). With regards to voting, small-
scale research could test many different tactics concurrently across a number of local 
governments. It stands to reason that this approach would more quickly reveal the 
tactic(s) that bring about higher levels of voter turnout, and would bring that nation one 
step closer to adopting a policy to implement at the national level. 
Two avenues for future small-scale research include systematic prompting and 
reinforcement procedures (Lang & Witts, 2016). Systematic prompting—that is, vocal or 
textual prompts that are arranged to occur in some sort of specific, recurring fashion—has 
been shown to be effective in changing behaviors with observable community outcomes, 
such as recycling, littering, and energy consumption (see Luyben, 2009, for a review). 
Using reinforcement to increase voting may be another option; although cost is a likely 
concern. One option might be to provide voters with a voucher to redeem a tax credit 
(Hicks, 2002). Another option might be to establish elections as a meta-contingency. 
Elections are not technically a meta-contingency because only one citizen is necessary to 
vote to produce a winner in a representative government. Elections, therefore, could be 
altered so that the result is contingent upon a threshold of aggregated responding. 
However, electoral quorums could bring about side-effects associated with extinction. It 
is possible that a separate meta-contingency could run parallel to election; for example, 




provided with a tax credit. These and other ideas appear to be reasonable methods for 
increasing voter turnout. What is needed next is small-scale testing. 
Small-scale testing could also enable researchers to go beyond the analysis of 
density or the number of polling stations. A thorough, process-level analysis may be 
useful in identifying the aspects of the polling stations and the voting process that have 
the greatest effect on voters. A functional assessment tool might be needed to detect 
features of the environment that affect voter turnout. It is possible that future research 
could adapt the Performance Diagnostic Checklist (Austin, 2000) for polling station 
processes. If troubleshooting is required, a process assessment would streamline 
investigations. If useful, these checklists could interest governments and/or regulating 
agencies that seek to optimize polling stations to promote voting. 
At the systems-level, one immediately clear way to promote voting is to 
implement or carry-on with any election system other than those that force, enable, or 
encourage two-party races. Analysis 3 reveals that parties who hold power evoke more 
and more votes towards the opposing party with each passing election. It is possible that 
government activity functions as a motivating operation for change, and therefore a 
government change is to be expected. The problem is that two-party systems consistently 
evoke votes towards the party not in power. This kind of predictability is likely to 
account for the lack of third-party competition; in other words, the system itself is a 
motivating operation that does little to bring about value in voting for third parties. This 
kind of predictability undermines a citizen’s ability to bring about the kind of change that 
they truly value; rather, they must compromise by voting for the only other alternative. 




option might be to conduct replicated A-B designs that capture a governing party’s 
popular vote relative to the popular vote of all other parties. There may be systems that 
allow for citizens to assume more control over the composition of government and thus 
avoid undue influence on how citizens vote. 
Two hurdles facing future group-level analyses are access to and management of 
data. Missing data was the most common reason for excluding a nation from the second 
analysis. Some nations do offer data sets for purchase; however, open data (i.e., publicly 
available data online) would be one less barrier for replication. Nations and researchers 
need to work together to identify and publish the relevant data for public access. These 
efforts would establish electoral accountability and transparency, and could bring 
researchers closer to positions to influence government to resolve low voter turnout. 
When researchers are in a position to solve problems, they will need to be familiar with 
technology that will more quickly produce graphical representations. For example, 
consider that Figure 12 summarized over 8000 individual measures. Microsoft Excel® 
was at best suited for data gathering and preparation. In these analyses, the user interface 
for Microsoft Excel® was ill-fit when attempting to produce the graphs specified by the 
procedures; further, complex graphical adjustments and scrolling through the data were 
frequently met with crashing. R program coding solved these problems and completed 
graphing much more quickly. It is also likely that future researcher’s may wish to gather 
geographical data about voting, in which case, knowledge of geographic information 
systems (GIS) will be necessary. Researchers interested in these topics must seek training 





There are many more implications that can be drawn from these present findings 
and discussion. Foremost, behavior analysts can and should being working with 
aggregated responding within groups. These analyses offer some validity for one 
phenomenon, but there are likely many others where single-case design is suitable. The 
behavior analytic field is tasked to change the world for the better (Houmanfar & 
Mattaini, 2016; Malott et al., 1995), and it is possible we can do more by treating the 
aggregated responding of a group as the single-case. Other fields readily conduct 
analyses at the group level—surely there are collaborations to be struck. Future research 
should conduct analyses at both the within- and between-group levels of analysis. 
Regarding voting, there likely are other variables that influence voter turnout. The first 
step is descriptive research at every level of analysis. Given the idiosyncratic nature of 
each nation’s electoral environment, within-group analyses might best demonstrate what 
works for a group. To that end, nations looking for to change their electoral system 
should aim to conduct small-scale, local government research (Lang & Witts, 2016). It is 
an avenue that will identify what works and what does not work more quickly than 
guesswork alone. Haphazard / non-systematic approaches that lack evidence simply 
misuse public funds; like using a slot machine, the policy makers—and citizens—could 
net a loss. Small-scale, local government research will produce tactics that work on a 
large-scale level. Public policy should—at all times—be an experiment (Campbell, 1969; 
Fawcett, Bernstein, et al., 1988). Experimentation, in turn, brings about policy that is 
error-free. That said, readers are cautioned against holding these results as truths; instead, 
readers are urged to evaluate these and other tactics on a small-scale, local government 




will bring about a high voting turnout for a nation. These types of investigations help 
ensure that citizens in democratic nations continue to enjoy a system that provides a non-







Original definitions of variability, level, and trend for analysis 1 
Item Definition 
Stable variability 
Data paths show little deviation from the overall trend 
direction as indicated by a relatively small degree of 
change in data path slopes. 
Variable variability 
Data paths show large deviation from the overall trend 
direction as indicated by the relatively large degree of 
change in data path slopes. 
High level The last three data paths trend at or above 80%. 
Low level 
One or more of the last three data paths trend below 
80%. 
Ascending trend 
Data paths trend away form the abscissa), “descending 
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa. 
Descending trend 
Data paths trend away form the abscissa), “descending 
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa. 
No-trend 
The data paths trend neither towards or away from the 
abscissa. 
Outlier 
Any data point that deviates 40% or more from the data 










Antigua and Barbuda No N/A 
Australia Yes AUD$20 fine with subsequent charges 
for repeat offenders (Australian 
Electoral Commission, n.d.-a) 
Austria No N/A 
Barbados No N/A 
Belgium Yes EUR$30-60 fines for first time non-
voters, EUR$60-150 fines for repeat 
non-voters, removal of right to vote 
for ten years if a voter has not voted in 
the last 15 years (Belgium’s Ministry 
of the Interior, n.d.) 
Brazil Yes Appointed court date and judge 
determines amount of fine (Brazil’s 
Superior Electoral Court, n.d.). 
Canada No N/A 
Colombia No N/A 
Costa Rica Yes None (International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
n.d.-a) 
Denmark No N/A 
Dominica No N/A 
El Salvador No N/A 
Finland No N/A 
France No N/A 









Honduras Yes None (International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
n.d.-a) 
Iceland No N/A 
India No N/A 
Ireland No N/A 




Public posting of names of non-voters 
at town halls (Jackman, 1987) 
Jamaica No N/A 
Japan No N/A 
Liechtenstein Yes SFR$20 fine (Liechtenstein 
Parliamentary Elections, n.d.) 
Luxembourg Yes Fines and increased fines for repeat 
non-voters (Luxembourg Legislative 
Elections, n.d.) 
Malta No N/A 
Mexico Yes In practice there are no sanctions 




~USD$30; however in practice fines 
were rarely issued (Irwin, 1974) 
New Zealand No N/A 
Norway No N/A 
Paraguay Yes USD$7-14 (ABC Color as cited in 
Duffy & Matros, 2014) 




Saint Kitts and Nevis No N/A 
Saint Lucia No N/A 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
No N/A 
Sweden No N/A 




Fines between USD$1-8 (Bódeva, 
2013) but there were difficulties with 
enforcement (Birch, 2009) 
Trinidad and Tobago No N/A 
United Kingdom No N/A 








Summary of the IOA training results for analysis 1 
 










1 27 2/4 19 0/2 
2 29 4/6 18 1/3 
3 X (14/23) - - - 
 20 9/10* - - 
Note: “T2C” means, “trials to criterion”; * means the test score meets the criterion to proceed with IOA; X 






Updated definitions of variability, level, and trend for analysis 1 
Item Definition 
Stable variability One or fewer data points fully cross the constraint lines. 
Variable variability Two or more data points fully cross the constraint lines. 
High level The last three data paths trend at or above 80%. 
Low level 
One or more of the last three data paths trend below 
80%. 
Ascending trend The slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is above 0.1. 
Descending trend The slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is below -0.1. 
No-trend 
The slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is between 0.1 
and -0.1. 
Outlier 
Any data point that deviates 40% or more from the data 






Comparison of visual analyses between observers 
Nations Visual Analysis Second Observer’s Visual 
Analysis 
Antigua and Barbuda 
EEV: A low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
ascending trend. 
EEV: A low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
ascending trend. 
Australia 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend;  
REG: A high stable no-
trend. 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend;  
REG: A high stable no-
trend. 
Austria 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Barbados 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Belgium 
EEV: A high stable no-
trend; 
REG: A high stable no-
trend. 
EEV: A high stable no-
trend; 
REG: A high stable no-
trend. 
Brazil 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low stable no-
trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low stable no-
trend. 
Canada 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Colombia 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend; 
REG: A low variable no-
trend. 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend; 
REG: A low variable no-
trend. 
Costa Rica 
EEV: A low variable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low variable 
descending trend; 






EEV: A high stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A high stable no-
trend. 
EEV: A high stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A high stable no-
trend. 
Dominica 
EEV: A high stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A high stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
El Salvador 
EEV: An initially low 
stable descending trend 
followed by a low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: An initially low 
variable ascending trend 
followed by a low variable 
no-trend. 
EEV: An initially low 
stable descending trend 
followed by a low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: An initially low 
variable ascending trend 
followed by a low variable 
no-trend. 
Finland 
EEV: A low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable no-
trend. 
EEV: A low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable no-
trend. 
France 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Germany 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Grenada 
EEV: A high variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable no-
trend. 
EEV: A high variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable no-
trend. 
Guatemala 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend (with 
CV); a low variable 
ascending trend (without 
CV); 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend (with 
CV); a low variable 
ascending trend (without 
CV). 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend (with CV); 
a low variable ascending 
trend (without CV); 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend (with 
CV); a low variable 






EEV: A low variable no-
trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low variable no-
trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
Iceland 
EEV: A high stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A high stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A high stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A high stable 
descending trend. 
India 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend; 
REG: A low stable no-
trend. 
EEV: A low stable no-
trend; 
REG: A low stable no-
trend. 
Ireland 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend.; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend.; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Israel 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend;  
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend;  
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Italy 
EEV: A high stable no-
trend (with CV); a low 
stable descending trend 
(without CV); 
REG: A high stable no-
trend (with CV); a low 
stable descending trend 
(without CV). 
EEV: A high stable no-
trend (with CV); a low 
stable descending trend 
(without CV); 
REG: A high stable no-
trend (with CV); a low 
stable descending trend 
(without CV). 
Jamaica 
EEV: A low variable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low variable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Japan 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Liechtenstein 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Luxembourg 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A high stable no-
trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 






EEV: A high stable no-
trend.; 
REG: A high stable 
ascending trend. 
EEV: A high stable no-
trend.; 
REG: A high stable 
ascending trend. 
Mexico 
EEV: A low variable no-
trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low variable no-
trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
Netherlands 
EEV: A high stable 
ascending trend (with CV); 
a low stable descending 
trend (without CV); 
REG: A high stable no-
trend (with CV); a low 
stable descending trend 
(without CV). 
EEV: A high stable 
ascending trend (with CV); 
a low stable descending 
trend (without CV); 
REG: A high stable no-
trend (with CV); a low 
stable descending trend 
(without CV). 
New Zealand 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Norway 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
Paraguay 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
Poland 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
Saint Lucia 
EEV: A low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low variable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A high stable 
ascending trend; 






EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A high stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A high stable 
descending trend. 
Switzerland 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend (with 
CV); a low stable no-trend 
(without CV); 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend (with 
CV); a low stable no-trend 
(without CV). 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend (with 
CV); a low stable no-trend 
(without CV); 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend (with 
CV); a low stable no-trend 
(without CV). 
Trinidad and Tobago 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
ascending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
ascending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
ascending trend. 
United Kingdom 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low stable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low stable 
descending trend. 
United States of America 
EEV: A low variable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 
EEV: A low variable 
descending trend; 
REG: A low variable 
descending trend. 







IOA reference table for “Variability” 
 Primary Author Analysis 
Second Observer Analysis Stable Variable 
Stable 69 0 
Variable 0 23 






IOA reference table for “Level” 
 Primary Author Analysis 
Second Observer Analysis High Low 
High 17 1 
Low 0 74 






IOA reference table for “Trend” 
 Primary Author Analysis 
Second Observer Analysis No-Trend Ascending Descending 
No-Trend 22 0 0 
Ascending 0 14 1 
Descending 0 0 55 






Summary of visual analysis across estimated eligible and registered voter turnout 
Group Count High level 
High and 




Estimated eligible voter turnout 
All 42 7 (17%) 2 (29%) 35 (83%) 28 (80%) 




6 (18%) 2 (33%) 27 (82%) 21 (78%) 
Registered voter turnout 
All 42 7 (17%) 2 (29%) 35 (83%) 33 (95%) 










Summary of statistical analysis across estimated eligible and registered voter turnout 
Variable df t p 
Estimated eligible voter turnout 
Between elections with and w/o CV 322.137 -1.590 0.113 
Excluding nations that have abolished CV 723 -2.033 0.042 
Within nations that have abolished CV 74 0.823 0.413 
Registered voter turnout 
Between elections with and w/o CV 777 6.675 0.001* 
Excluding nations that have abolished CV 701 6.673 0.001* 
Within nations that have abolished CV 74 2.625 0.011 






Included nations, outliers, visual analyses, and IOA for analysis 2 
Election Outliers Removed Visual Analysis IOA 
Australia 
2007 6 No relation NVAL 
2010 6 No relation NVAL 
2013 7 No relation NVAL 
Canada 
2008 28 No relation NVAL 
2011 27 No relation NVAL 
2015 30 No relation NVAL 
Jamaica 
2007 3 No relation NVAL 
2011 4 No relation NVAL 
2016 3 No relation NVAL 
Luxembourg 
2004 13 No relation NVAL 
2009 15 No relation NVAL 
2013 8 No relation NVAL 
New Zealand 
2008 7 No relation NVAL 
2011 7 No relation NVAL 
2014 7 No relation NVAL 






Definitions of different trends and variables for analysis 3 
Item Definition 
Condition 
A period where one political party controlled the 
majority of seats in a government legislature or 
congress. 
Ascending trend 
Data paths trend away from the abscissa), “descending 
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa. 
Descending trend 
Data paths trend away from the abscissa), “descending 
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa. 
No-trend 
The data paths trend neither towards nor away from the 
abscissa. 
Third party conflict 
An election where a third party observed 15% or more of 






Included nations, visual analyses, and IOA for analysis 3 
Condition Visual Analysis IOA 
Barbados 
BLP in power Descending 3/3 
BLP not in power Ascending 3/3 
DLP in power Descending 3/3 
DLP not in power Ascending 3/3 
Jamaica 
JLP in power Descending 2/3 
JLP not in power Ascending 3/3 
PNP in power Descending 3/3 
PNP not in power Ascending 3/3 
Liechtenstein 
PC in power Descending 3/3 
PC not in power Descending 2/3 
PU in power Descending 3/3 
PU not in power No-trend 3/3 
USA 
Democrats in power Descending 2/3 
Democrats not in power Ascending 3/3 
Republicans in power Descending 3/3 







Figure 1. A condensed line graph displaying the level of estimated eligible voter turnout 
across elections for each nation analyzed. Open circles represent elections held without 




indicate that the data path trended below 80%; thick data paths indicate that the data path 
trended entirely above 80%. Nations were arranged according to their use of CV and in 







Figure 2. A condensed line graph displaying the level of registered voter turnout across 
elections for each nation analyzed. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; thin data paths 




trended entirely above 80%. Nations were arranged according to their use of CV and in 







Figure 3. A multiple-baseline graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered voter 
turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the horizontal 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical dotted line 







Figure 4. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered 
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line 
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with 





Figure 5. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered 
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line 







Figure 6. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered 
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line 
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with 





Figure 7. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered 
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line 
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with 





Figure 8. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered 
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line 
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with 





Figure 9. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered 
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without 
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line 
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with 





Figure 10. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and 
registered voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held 
without compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 





Figure 11. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and 
registered voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held 
without compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






Figure 12. A strip-line plot displaying the ratio of registered voters to polling stations 
within each constituency in the three most-recent elections within included nations. The 





Figure 13. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 14. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 15. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 16. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 17. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 18. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 19. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 20. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 21. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 22. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 23. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 24. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 25. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 26. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 27. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of 







Figure 28. A repeated A-B graph displaying alternating conditions of party control and 
its effect on popular vote within two-party nations included in analysis 3. For Barbados, 
circles represent the Barbados Labour Party and diamonds represent the Democratic 
Labour Party; for Jamaica, circles represent the Jamaica Labour Party and diamonds 




Citizens’ Party and diamonds represent the Patriotic Union; for the United States of 
America, circles represent the Democratic Party and diamonds represent the Republican 
Party. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government. 






Figure 29. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Barbados Labour 
Party (circles) and Democratic Labour Party (diamonds) across Barbadian general 
elections. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national 






Figure 30. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Jamaica Labour Party 
(circles) and People's National Party (diamonds) across Jamaican general elections. Filled 
data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government. Phase lines 






Figure 31. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Progressive Citizens’ 
Party (circles) and Patriotic Union (diamonds) across Liechtenstein general elections. 
Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government. Phase 






Figure 32. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Democratic Party 
(circles) and Republican Party (diamonds) across presidential elections in the United 
States of America. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national 
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Appendix A: IOA Training Materials 
IOA Rubric 
(1) Determine the trend. No-trend: the data paths trend neither towards or away 
from the abscissa. Ascending trend: data paths trend away from the abscissa. Descending 
trend: data paths trend toward the abscissa. Changing trend: data paths initially trend in 
one direction and then begin to trend in a different direction (i.e., initially trend X 
followed by trend Y). When in doubt, do a pencil test to determine if there is a direction 
to the trend.  
For example: (i) “Initially ascending trend followed by no-trend”, (ii) “Initially 
no-trend followed by descending trend”, (iii) “Initially descending trend followed by 
ascending trend”. 
 (2) Determine the variability (if changing trend, indicate for both trends). 
Stable: data paths show little deviation from the overall trend direction as indicated by a 
relatively small degree of change in data path slopes. Variable: data paths show large 
deviation from the overall trend direction as indicated by the relatively large degree of 
change in data path slopes. 
(3) Determine the level (if changing trend, indicate for both trends). High: the 
last three data paths trend at or above 80%. Low: one or more of the last three data paths 
trend below 80%. Note: a continuously ascending or descending trend may be attributed 
as a high to low or low to high trend. 
(4) Write the findings. For example: (i) “A low stable ascending trend”, (ii) “A 


















Practice Graph 2. An initially high stable no-trend followed by a low variable 





Practice Graph 3. A low variable ascending trend. 
 






Practice Graph 5. A high stable no-trend. 
 






Practice Graph 7. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a high stable no-
trend. 
 





Practice Graph 9. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low variable 
descending. 
 





Practice Graph 11. A low stable no-trend. 
 

















Practice Graph 15. A low variable descending trend. 
 







































































































































































Appendix B: Analysis 1 Visual Analysis (V1VA) Graphs 
 
A1VA Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and Barbuda. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and 
Barduda. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s 






A1VA Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 4. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The dotted line 







A1VA Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The dotted line 







A1VA Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El Salvador. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala. The 
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical 
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical dotted 







A1VA Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The dotted line 







A1VA Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The dotted line 







A1VA Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy. The horizontal 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical dotted line 







A1VA Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy. The 
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical 
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The dotted line 







A1VA Graph 50. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Liechtenstein. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Luxembourg. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The dotted line 







A1VA Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands. The 
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical 
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the 
Netherlands. The horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or 
path; the vertical dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s 






A1VA Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New Zealand. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 64. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 66. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and Nevis. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts 
and Nevis. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s 






A1VA Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Lucia. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s 






A1VA Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 






A1VA Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The dotted 







A1VA Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election 






A1VA Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland. The 
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical 
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland. 
The horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the 
vertical dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate 






A1VA Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and Tobago. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad and 
Tobago. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s 






A1VA Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United Kingdom. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an 






A1VA Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
Kingdom. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s 






A1VA Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of 
America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s 






A1VA Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
States of America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 






Appendix C: Updated IOA Practice Graphs 
 
Practice Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and 
Barbuda. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 







Practice Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and 
Barbuda. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 







Practice Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 4. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 







Practice Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 







Practice Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El 
Salvador. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained 







Practice Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first 
condition as a low variable descending trend. Observers were trained to label the second 






Practice Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the 
first condition as a low variable descending trend. Observers were trained to label the 






Practice Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 







Practice Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first 
condition as a high stable ascending trend. Observers were trained to label the second 






Practice Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first 
condition as a high stable ascending trend. Observers were trained to label the second 






Practice Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 50. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in 
Liechtenstein. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 







Practice Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in 
Luxembourg. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 







Practice Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the 
first condition as a high stable ascending trend. Observers were trained to label the 






Practice Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the 
Netherlands. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 
trained to label the first condition as a low stable ascending trend. Observers were trained 






Practice Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New 
Zealand. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 64. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 66. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 







Practice Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and 
Nevis. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts 
and Nevis. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained 







Practice Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint 
Lucia. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 







Practice Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 
Observers were trained to label this graph as a low stable descending trend followed by a 






Practice Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The data 
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as 






Practice Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden. 
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland. The 
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first 
condition as a low stable no-trend. Observers were trained to label the second condition 






Practice Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in 
Switzerland. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 
trained to label the first condition as a low stable no-trend. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and 
Tobago. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 







Practice Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad 
and Tobago. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 







Practice Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United 
Kingdom. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained 







Practice Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
Kingdom. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained 







Practice Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of 
America. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained 






Practice Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
States of America. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 
trained to label this graph as an initially low variable no-trend trend followed by a low 






Appendix D: Analysis 1 Visual Analysis (V1VA) Graphs Version 2 
 
A1VA-2 Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and 
Barbuda. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and 
Barbuda. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El Salvador. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala under 
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala 
under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or 
path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala without 
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala 
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point 
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy under 
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy under 
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy without 
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 50. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy 
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point 
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in 
Liechtenstein. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the 
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates 






A1VA-2 Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in 
Luxembourg. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the 
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates 






A1VA-2 Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands 
under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or 
path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 64. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the 
Netherlands under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” 
data point or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along 






A1VA-2 Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands 
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point 
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 66. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the 
Netherlands without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a 
“high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number 






A1VA-2 Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New 
Zealand. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and 
Nevis. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts 
and Nevis. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The 
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate 
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-






A1VA-2 Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Lucia. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the 
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates 






A1VA-2 Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point 
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The dotted 
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the 
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-






A1VA-2 Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden. 
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines 
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of 






A1VA-2 Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland under 
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland 
under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or 
path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 85. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland without 
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 86. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland 
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point 
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






A1VA-2 Graph 87. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and 
Tobago. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 88. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad 
and Tobago. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the 
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates 






A1VA-2 Graph 89. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United 
Kingdom. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 90. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
Kingdom. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 91. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of 
America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey 
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the 






A1VA-2 Graph 92. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
States of America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; 
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa 






Appendix E: IOA Training Materials Version 3.0 
IOA Rubric 
(1) Determine the level.  
High: the last three data paths trend at or above 80%.  
Low: one or more of the last three data paths trend below 80%. 
(2) Determine the variability.  
Stable: one or fewer data points fully cross the constraint lines. 
Variable: two or more data points fully cross the constraint lines. 
(3) Determine the trend.  
No-trend: the slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is between 0.1 and -0.1.  
Ascending trend: the slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is above 0.1.  
Descending trend: the slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is below -0.1.  
(4) Write the findings.  
For example:  
(i) “A low stable ascending trend,” 
(ii) “A high variable no-trend,” 
(iii) “A low stable no-trend,” 







Practice Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and 
Barbuda. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and 
Barbuda. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 4. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El 
Salvador. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 







Practice Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala under 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala 
under compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala without 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala 
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 





Practice Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy under 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy under 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy without 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 50. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy without 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in 
Liechtenstein. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers 






Practice Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in 
Luxembourg. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers 






Practice Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands under 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 64. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands under 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands 
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 66. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands 
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New 
Zealand. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and 
Nevis. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts 
and Nevis. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The 
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label 






Practice Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint 
Lucia. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers 






Practice Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The data 
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this 






Practice Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden. 
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to 






Practice Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland under 
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland 
under compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 85. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland 
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 86. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland 
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Practice Graph 87. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and 
Tobago. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 88. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad 
and Tobago. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers 






Practice Graph 89. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United 
Kingdom. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 90. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
Kingdom. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 91. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of 
America. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were 






Practice Graph 92. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United 
States of America. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. 






Appendix F: Analysis 2 Visual Analysis (V2VA) Graphs 
 
A2VA Graph 1. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 2. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 3. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 4. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 5. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 6. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 7. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 8. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 9. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 10. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 11. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 12. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 13. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 14. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







A2VA Graph 15. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio 







Appendix G: Analysis 3 Visual Analysis (V3VA) Graphs 
 
A3VA Graph 1. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Barbados Labour 
Party (circles) and Democratic Labour Party (diamonds) across Barbadian general 
elections. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national 






A3VA Graph 2. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Jamaica Labour 
Party (circles) and People's National Party (diamonds) across Jamaican general elections. 
Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government. Phase 






A3VA Graph 3. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Progressive 
Citizens’ Party (circles) and Patriotic Union (diamonds) across Liechtenstein general 
elections. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national 






A3VA Graph 4. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Democratic Party 
(circles) and Republican Party (diamonds) across presidential elections in the United 
States of America. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national 
government. Phase lines represent a change in power from one party to the other. 
 
 
